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SPELLMAN, Lynne, Substance and Separation in Aristotle. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (...), 1995. 1st ed. IX,131p. Original balck cloth with dust wrps. 'Lynne Spellman's book fits nicely within the recent tradition of Aristotle Metaphysics scholarship. (...) There is some novelty, and, certainly, some truth in the book's claim that Aristotle's account of substance must be understood in the light of what Aristotle does and does not accept in Platonism. As Spellman puts it, 'Aristotle can be seen to offer a defensible version of Platonism (1).' More precisely, substances are like Forms without the separation (suitably understood). Even more precisely, the author argues that for Aristotle a substance is a 'specimen of a natural kind, where specimens, as particular forms lacking the accidents introduced by matter, are numerically the same as sensible objects yet not identical with them (2).' The evidence for this conclusion is set forth in roughly the first half of the book. The second half contains a rather hurried and therefore unsatisfactory account of Aristotelian epistemology and teleology, purporting to show that, on the author's reading, substances retain their priority in knowledge, and, on the same reading, substances can be said to retain teleological priority over individual sensibles.' (LLOYD P. GERSON in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 95.12.25). From the library of Prof. Carl Deroux. € 34.50 (Antiquarian) ISBN: 9780521471473